We consider a two-player linear-state differential game, where one player intervenes continuously in the game, while the other implements an impulse control. When the impulse instants are exogenous, we obtain the classical result in linear-state differential games that open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria coincide. When the impulse instants are endogenous, we show that this result no longer holds. In particular, the two equilibria are different. We show that the impulse level is a constant in both equilibria. More importantly, in the open-loop case, we show that the equilibrium number of impulses is at most one, while there can be at most two impulses in the feedback case.
Introduction
In problems having one decision maker, impulse controls have been quite naturally used in instances involving a fixed (or transaction) cost, as in, e.g., cash management (Constantinides and Richard (1978) , Baccarin (2009) ), portfolio optimization (Korn (1998) ), exchange rate intervention (Jeanblanc-Picqué (1993) , Cadenillas and Zapatero (1999) , Bensoussan et al. (2012) ), inventory control problems (Sulem (1986) , Bensoussan et al. (2005) ), and investment in product quality (Reddy et al. (2016) ). For a survey of applications of impulse control in management, see Bensoussan and Tapiero (1982) . Impulse control has been introduced in zero-sum differential games to study different problems, e.g., pursuit evasion (Chikrii et al. (2007) ), option pricing ( Bernhard et al. (2006 ), El Farouq et al. (2010 ), and pollution control (Ferrari and Koch (2019) ). For zero-sum impulse-control differentiable games with one player using an ordinary control, and the other using an impulse control, see Zhang (2011 ), Azimzadeh (2019 . In differential games with impulse control, the player who acts at discrete time instants solves an impulse control problem. The Hamiltonian Maximum Principle (see Blaquière (1977a) , Blaquière (1977b) , Blaquière (1979) , Blaquière (1985) ) and the Bensoussan-Lions quasi-variational inequalities (see Bensoussan and Lions (1982) , Bensoussan and Lions (1984) ) provide a framework to determine the time and level of such interventions. Recent works that use quasi-variational inequalities (QVI) to determine the equilibrium in stochastic differential games with impulse control include Cosso (2013) , El Asri and Mazid (2018), Aïd et al. (2019) , Ferrari and Koch (2019) , and Azimzadeh (2019) . In Cosso (2013) and El Asri and Mazid (2018) , both players use impulse controls, and the game is zero-sum. Aïd et al. (2019) consider a two-player symmetric infinite-horizon nonzero-sum LSDG where both players only use impulse controls. The authors solved QVIs to analytically characterize the solution and obtained multiple equilibria.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. When the timing of impulses is exogenously given, the open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria coincide. When the timing of impulses is endogenous, the two equilibria are different. In the open-loop case, the equilibrium number of impulse is at most one, while there can be at most two impulses in the feedback case. For the situations where both the continuous payoff and salvage value of player 2 are either increasing in state or decreasing in state, we show that there can be at most one impulse in the FNE. We obtain uniqueness of equilibrium in both the open-loop and feedback cases. Further, we show that the impulse level is a constant in both equilibria. The equilibrium impulse timing in the feedback case is completely characterized by the problem parameters of player 2, whereas in open-loop case, the impulse timing also depends on player 1's problem parameters. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce our model. In Section 3, we compare the open-loop and feedback equilibria, assuming that the impulse instants are known a priori while, in Section 4, we characterize the two equilibria when the impulse instants are endogenous. Section 5 concludes.
Model
In this section, 3 we introduce a scalar deterministic finite-horizon two-player nonzero-sum linear-state differential game model, where player 1 uses ordinary controls while player 2 uses impulse controls. Let T < ∞ be the duration of the game. Denote by u(t) ∈ Ω u ⊂ R the control action of player 1 at time t ∈ [0, T ] where Ω u is assumed to be a compact set.ũ ∈ U denotes the strategy of player 1 where U := Ω u × [0, T ] is the strategy set of player 1. Player 2 gives an
and Ω v is assumed to be a compact set. The strategy of player 2 is denoted byṽ = ((v 1 , τ 1 ), (v 2 , τ 2 ), ....., (v k , τ k )) ∈ V, where V is her strategy set. The number of impulses k is also a decision variable of player 2. The state trajectory during the non-impulse instants evolves as follows:
At the impulse instants, the jump in the state trajectory is given by
Clearly, player 1 influences the evolution of state variable during the non-impulse instants whereas player 2's control results in the jump in the state variable at the impulse instants. Player 1 uses strategyũ to maximize the objective
and player 2 uses strategyṽ to maximize the objective
where C < 0 denotes the fixed cost of each impulse and 1 2 P 2 v 2 i the variable cost of the impulse at time instant τ i , with P 2 < 0, and R 1 < 0. To simplify the notations, we let τ 0 := 0 and τ k+1 := T .
Definition 1 The strategy profile (ũ,ṽ) is a Nash equilibrium of the differential game (1-4) if the following inequalities are satisfied:
In the OLNE (see Sadana et al. (2019) ), the players' strategies depend on time (and on the initial state, which is a given parameter), while in the feedback information structure, the players' strategies are functions of state and time; see Başar and Olsder (1999) .
Exogenous impulse instant
In this section, we consider a scalar linear-state differential game instance described by (1-4), where the impulse instants {τ 1 , τ 2 , . . . , τ k } are exogenously given. We characterize Nash equilibrium strategies for both open-loop and feedback information structures. The next theorem characterizes the OLNE of the differential game (1-4). The proof of this theorem is given in Sadana et al. (2019) , and the results are mentioned here for completeness.
Theorem 1 (Exogenous OLNE) If the impulse instants {τ 1 , τ 2 , . . . , τ k } are given, then the unique OLNE strategies are given by
where
. . , k}, so that, at the impulse instants, we have
Proof. Player 1 solves an optimal control problem, and the necessary conditions for OLNE can be obtained by using the approach given in Geering (1976) . Player 2 solves an impulse control problem with the impulse timing being given, and the necessary conditions follow from Chahim et al. (2012) . Before proceeding further, we define the Hamiltonian of player 1 as
and the Hamiltonian, and the impulse Hamiltonian of player 2 (see Chahim et al. (2012) ) are given by
where λ 1 (t) and λ 2 (t) are the costates of player 1 and player 2. The equilibrium control u(t) of player 1 is obtained by maximizing the Hamiltonian of player 1 with respect to u(t), which gives
To obtain the equilibrium control v i of player 2, we maximize the impulse Hamiltonian of player 2 with respect to v i , which leads to
We can write the necessary conditions for the OLNE as follows:
For t ∈ {τ 1 , τ 2 , ....., τ k },
From the above equations, we can obtain the expression for λ 1 (t) and λ 2 (t) as follows:
On substituting the expression of λ 1 (t) and λ 2 (t) in (8) and (9) respectively, we obtain the analytical characterization of the equilibrium control of player 1 and player 2.
Using the dynamic programming principle, we can obtain the FNE.
Theorem 2 (Exogenous FNE) If the impulse instants {τ 1 , τ 2 , . . . , τ k } are given, the unique FNE is given by
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1 From (7a)-(7b) and (12a)-(12b), we can conclude that the OLNE and FNE coincide when the impulse instants are exogenously given.
As mentioned in the introduction, in a linear-state differential game, OLNE and FNE coincide when the players use ordinary controls. The above theorem extends this result to the class of linear-state differential games with one player using impulse control.
Endogenous impulse instant
In this section, we characterize the OLNE and FNE when the impulse instants are determined endogenously.
Assumption 1 We assume that impulse instants are interior, i.e., 
Open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE)
In linear-state open-loop differential games with impulse control, Sadana et al. (2019) showed that the equilibrium is unique and the number of impulses is at most one. The necessary conditions given in Sadana et al. (2019) still hold, even if there is a fixed cost at the impulse instant. 4 Define
Theorem 3 (Endogenous OLNE) Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the number of impulse instants for player 2 is at most one, that is, k ≤ 1, in the unique open-loop equilibrium. Further, when the parameters satisfy either of the following conditions (see Figure 1 )
then, k = 1. The equilibrium timing and level of impulse are given by
The equilibrium control of player 1 is given by
Proof. When player 2 solves her optimal control problem (with player 1's strategy fixed at her OLNE strategy), conditions (10a)-(10f) hold true. Besides these, at the impulse instants, the Hamiltonian continuity condition holds true; see Chahim et al. (2012) . This implies that, at the impulse instant τ i , we have
). Using the conditions, (10d), (10e), (10f), we can rewrite the Hamiltonian continuity condition as
This implies
λ 2 (τ i ) = 0 implies v i = 0, so there can be no interior impulse for A = 0 at equilibrium. Since λ 2 (t) is strictly monotone in t, we obtain a unique solution:
From (11b) and (15), we obtain a unique equilibrium impulse instant
which is an interior impulse instant if 0 < τ ol < T. This implies that we must have T − 1 A ln δ q1
Feedback Nash equilibrium (FNE)
Now, we characterize the FNE when player 2 determines both the timing and the level of the impulses. Let V 1 : [0, T ] × R → R be the value function of player 1. Let player 2's equilibrium strategy be given by
, the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation holds true:
At the jump instants, {τ 1 , τ 2 , . . . , τ k }, the value functions are related as follows:
Given the linear-state structure of the game, we postulate the value function to be linear, that is, V 1 (t, x) = α 1 (t)x + β 1 (t). The HJB equation is given by
Differentiating the right-hand side with respect to u(t) and equating to zero, we get
Substituting for the above equilibrium control in the HJB equation, we obtain
Applying the method of undetermined coefficients giveṡ
From (17), at any impulse instant τ i , we have the following relation:
Consider the impulse control problem of player 2 and let her value function be given by V 2 (t, x).
Assumption 2 We assume that V 2 : [0, T ] × R → R is continuous and continuously differentiable in its arguments.
Remark 2 Smooth value functions are widely assumed in the optimal control literature. The book Art of Smooth Pasting provides a heuristic justification of the continuity and differentiability of the value function in optimal stopping-time problems (Dixit (1993) ).
Given the data (t, x), we define the operator R as follows:
We introduce the Hamiltonian function H 2 : [0, T ] × R × R as follows:
The impulse control problem of player 2 satisfies the Bensoussan-Lions quasi-variational inequalities (Bensoussan and Lions (1982) , Bensoussan and Lions (1984) ), that is,
In the following, we provide a heuristic interpretation of the equilibrium conditions for player 2. When the state is at a given level x at time t, player 2 can either give an impulse or wait. Suppose that in the time interval [t, t + h], an impulse does not occur. Since player 2 waits, using the dynamic programming principle, we conclude that the value function is bounded from below by the sum of the running profit from t to t + h and the optimal profit from time t + h onwards, that is,
From Assumption 2 and using a Taylor series expansion of the above expression, and letting h → 0, we obtain (23a). Now, if it is optimal for player 2 to give an impulse at time t, then the state jumps from x(t) to x(t) + Qv, such that
This verifies (23b). Clearly, at any (t, x), player 2 can either wait, which implies that (23a) holds with equality, or she can give an impulse so that (23b) holds with equality. This implies that the complementarity condition (23c) holds to ensure that either (23a) or (23b) holds with equality. From Assumption 1, there can be no impulse at the final time so the value function is equal to the salvage value at the final time, which justifies condition (23d).
We define the following two sets. The first is a stopping set S, defined as
When the pair (t, x) lies in the stopping set, it is optimal for player 2 to give an impulse. The second is a continuation set C, defined as
The continuation set characterizes the impulse-free region in the game. Assuming V 2 (t, x) = α 2 (t)x + β 2 (t), we compute RV 2 as
In the impulse-free region, (23a) holds with equality. Assuming the value function V 2 (t, x) = α 2 (t)x + β 2 (t), and using (18) in (23a), we obtain
Solving for α 2 (t), we have
Substituting back in (26) yields
In the stopping set, we have V 2 (t, x) = RV 2 (t, x). Using the above equation, we obtain
The stopping set is given by
Remark 3 In the linear-state differential games with impulse control, the stopping set is independent of the state of the system.
Solving (29), we get that player 2 can give an impulse at time τ 1
Inserting α 2 (t) in (28), we get the corresponding impulse levels v 1 = − sign(Q)( 2C P2 and v 2 fb = sign(Q) 2C P2 , respectively.
Clearly, α 2 (t) is strictly monotone in t, so it can take values 2P2C Q 2 and − 2P2C Q 2 at most once. Let γ = 2P2C Q 2 . We obtain two solutions, τ 1 fb and τ 2 fb , for the impulse instants, which are given by
As2+w2 , A = 0 For τ 1 fb and τ 2 fb to be interior impulse instants, we must have 0 < τ 1 fb < T and 0 < τ 2 fb < T . In the following discussion, we study the parameter regions in the (w 2 , s 2 ) plane that result in zero, one, and two impulse instants.
Using a similar analysis, we conclude that τ 2 fb > 0 whenever (T w 2 + s 2 + γ)w 2 > 0, and τ 2 fb < T whenever (γ + s 2 )w 2 < 0. Figure 2 (a) illustrates in the (w 2 , s 2 ) space the parameter regions corresponding to the impulse instants τ 1 fb and τ 2 fb . Further, when both τ 1 fb and τ 2 fb exist and are interior impulse instants, then, whenever w 2 > 0, we have that 0 < τ 1 fb < τ 2 fb < T , and whenever w 2 < 0, we have that 0 < τ 2 fb < τ 1 fb < T .
with
As 2 ) > 0 (for the logarithm to exist), and w 2 (e AT − 1) + As 2 e AT − Aγ (w 2 + As 2 ) < 0. Next, for τ 1 fb < T , we require that 0 < w2+Aγ w2+As2 < 1, and this implies (w 2 + Aγ)(w 2 + As 2 ) > 0 and (γ − s 2 )(w 2 + As 2 ) > 0. Using a similar analysis, we conclude that τ 2 fb > 0 whenever (w 2 − Aγ)(w 2 + As 2 ) > 0 and w 2 (e AT − 1) + As 2 e AT + Aγ (w 2 + As 2 ) < 0. Further, τ 2 fb < T whenever (w 2 − Aγ)(w 2 + As 2 ) > 0 and (γ + s 2 )(w 2 + As 2 ) < 0. Figure 2(b) illustrates in the (w 2 , s 2 ) space the parameter regions corresponding to the impulse instants τ 1 fb and τ 2 fb . Further, when both τ 1 fb and τ 2 fb exist and are interior impulse instants, then whenever w 2 + As 2 > 0, we have that 0 < τ 1 fb < τ 2 fb < T , and whenever w 2 + As 2 < 0, we have that 0 < τ 2 fb < τ 1 fb < T .
3. with A > 0: For τ 1 fb > 0 we require that T − 1 A ln w2+Aγ As2+w2 > 0, which implies (w 2 + Aγ)(w 2 + As 2 ) > 0 (for the logarithm to exist), and w 2 (1 − e −AT ) + As 2 − Aγe −AT (w 2 + As 2 ) > 0. Next, for τ 1 fb < T , we require that w2+Aγ w2+As2 > 1, and this implies (γ − s 2 )(w 2 + As 2 ) > 0. Using a similar analysis, we conclude that τ 2 fb > 0 whenever (w 2 − Aγ)(w 2 + As 2 ) > 0 and w 2 (1 − e −AT ) + As 2 + Aγe −AT (w 2 + As 2 ) > 0. Further, τ 2 fb < T whenever (w 2 − Aγ)(w 2 + As 2 ) > 0 and (γ + s 2 )(w 2 + As 2 ) < 0. Figure 2(c) illustrates in the (w 2 , s 2 ) space the parameter regions corresponding to the impulse instants τ 1 fb and τ 2 fb . Further, when both τ 1 fb and τ 2 fb exist and are interior impulse instants, then whenever w 2 +As 2 > 0, we have that 0 < τ 1 fb < τ 2 fb < T , and whenever w 2 + As 2 < 0, we have that 0 < τ 2 fb < τ 1 fb < T .
We summarize the above discussion in the next theorem.
Theorem 4 Suppose that Assumption 1 and 2 hold. Then, there can exist at most two interior impulses in the FNE, that is, k ≤ 2.
• If any of the following conditions hold (a) with A = 0 : w 2 > 0, T w 2 + s 2 > γ, s 2 < −γ or w 2 < 0, T w 2 + s 2 < −γ, s 2 > γ, (b) with A < 0 : w 2 (e AT − 1) + As 2 e AT < Aγ, s 2 < −γ or w 2 (1 − e −AT ) + As 2 > −Aγe −AT , s 2 > γ, (c) with A > 0 : w 2 (1−e −AT )+As 2 > Aγe −AT , s 2 < −γ or w 2 (1−e −AT )+As 2 < −Aγe −AT , s 2 > γ, then there are exactly two interior impulses τ 1 fb and τ 2 fb with the equilibrium timing and levels given by v 1 fb and v 2 fb , respectively. • τ 1 fb is the only interior impulse if the parameters satisfy either of the following conditions:
(a) with A = 0 : (T w 2 + s 2 − γ)w 2 > 0, T w 2 + s 2 > −γ, (γ − s 2 )w 2 > 0, s 2 > −γ, (b) with A < 0 : w 2 (e AT − 1) + As 2 e AT < Aγ, −γ < s 2 < γ, w 2 (e AT − 1) + As 2 e AT < −Aγ or s 2 > γ, w 2 (e AT − 1) + As 2 e AT > Aγ, w 2 (e AT − 1) + As 2 e AT < −Aγ, (c) with A > 0 : −γ < s 2 < γ, w 2 (1 − e −AT ) + As 2 > Aγe −AT , w 2 (1 − e −AT ) + As 2 > −Aγe −AT or s 2 > γ, w 2 (1 − e −AT ) + As 2 < Aγe −AT , w 2 (1 − e −AT ) + As 2 > −Aγe −AT .
• τ 2 fb is the only interior impulse if parameters satisfy either of the following conditions:
(a) with A = 0 : (T w 2 + s 2 + γ)w 2 > 0, T w 2 + s 2 < γ, (γ + s 2 )w 2 < 0, s 2 < γ, (b) with A < 0 : w 2 (e AT − 1) + As 2 e AT < −Aγ, s 2 < −γ, w 2 (e AT − 1) + As 2 e AT > Aγ or −γ < s 2 < γ, w 2 (e AT − 1) + As 2 e AT > −Aγ, w 2 (e AT − 1) + As 2 e AT > Aγ, (c) with A > 0 : s 2 < −γ, w 2 (1 − e −AT ) + As 2 > −Aγe −AT , w 2 (1 − e −AT ) + As 2 < Aγe −AT or −γ < s 2 < γ, w 2 (1 − e −AT ) + As 2 < −Aγe −AT , w 2 (1 − e −AT ) + As 2 < Aγe −AT .
Remark 4 We have the following observations: (i) The level of impulse is a constant and proportional to the ratio of fixed cost C to the coefficient of proportional transaction cost P 2 . Note that P 2 can be interpreted as the marginal cost at zero impulse, i.e.,
. (ii) The timing of an impulse by player 2 is independent of player 1's parameters.
Indeed, it depends on player 2's parameter values and the coefficient entering the state dynamics. (iii) From (27b), we can infer that β 2 (t) is not differentiable at impulse instants because α 1 (t) is discontinuous at those instants. Finally, (iv) when there are two impulses, their levels are negative of each other.
Next, we provide the equilibrium control of player 1 when 0 < τ 1 fb < τ 2 fb < T and 0 < τ 1 fb < T . For 0 < τ 1 fb < τ 2 fb < T , the equilibrium control of player 1 is obtained by first solving for α 1 (.) from (19a) and (20a),
From u(t) = − B R1 α 1 (t), we obtain the equilibrium control of player 1. Similarly, we can determine the equilibrium control when 0 < τ 2 fb < τ 1 fb < T . When only impulse τ 1 fb can occur, the equilibrium control of player 1 is given by
Comparison of open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria
Comparing the OLNE and FNE shows that when the timing of impulses is a decision variable, we no longer obtain the result that the two equilibria coincide in a linear-state differential game. This is one of the main takeaways of our paper. Note, however, that we still have uniqueness of equilibrium in both the open-loop and feedback cases.
Remark 5 It is clear from Theorem 4 that there is exactly one interior impulse in the FNE if both the continuous payoff and salvage value of player 2 either increase in x or decrease in x, i.e., if w 2 > 0, s 2 > 0 or w 2 < 0, s 2 < 0.
We have already determined that with A = 0, there is no interior impulse in the OLNE while there are at most two interior impulses in the FNE. We are left with studying the equilibrium solutions when A = 0.
1. Assume that player 2 incurs a running cost, i.e., w 2 < 0, and that the salvage value of player 2 is decreasing in x, i.e., s 2 < 0.
With A > 0, τ ol is the interior impulse in the OLNE if q 1 < 0 and q 1 δ < As 2 + w 2 < q 1 δe −AT (see Figure  1(b) ) and in the FNE, τ 2 fb is the interior impulse if w 2 (1 − e −AT ) + As 2 + Aγe −AT < 0 and −γ < s 2 hold (see Figure 2 (c)).
With A < 0, τ ol is the interior impulse in the OLNE if q 1 > 0 and q 1 δ < As 2 + w 2 < q 1 δe −AT (see Figure  1 (c)), or q 1 < 0 and q 1 δe −AT < As 2 + w 2 < q 1 δ (see Figure 1(d) ). For A < 0, τ 2 fb is the interior impulse in the FNE if −γ < s 2 and w 2 (e AT − 1) + As 2 e AT + Aγ > 0, or w 2 (e AT − 1) + As 2 e AT + Aγ < 0 and s 2 < −γ hold; see Figure 2 (b).
2. Second, we assume that player 2 values the state positively so that w 2 > 0 and her salvage value is increasing in x, i.e., s 2 > 0.
With A > 0, τ ol is the interior impulse in the OLNE if q 1 > 0 and q 1 δe −AT < As 2 + w 2 < q 1 δ (see Figure  1(a) ), and in the FNE, τ 1 fb is the interior impulse if w 2 (1 − e −AT ) + As 2 − Aγe −AT > 0 and s 2 < γ (see Figure 2 (c)).
With A < 0, τ ol is the interior impulse in the OLNE if q 1 > 0 and q 1 δ < As 2 + w 2 < q 1 δe −AT (see Figure  1 (c)) or q 1 < 0 and q 1 δe −AT < As 2 + w 2 < q 1 δ (see Figure 1(d) ), and in the FNE, τ 1 fb is the only interior impulse if w 2 (e AT − 1) + As 2 e AT − Aγ < 0 and s 2 < γ, or w 2 (e AT − 1) + As 2 e AT − Aγ > 0 and s 2 > γ (see Figure 2(c) ).
Conclusions
In this paper, we determined open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria in the scalar deterministic finite-horizon two-player nonzero-sum linear-state differential game with impulse controls, in two cases, namely, when the impulse instants are given and when player 2 endogenously determines the equilibrium timing of the impulses. We showed that open-loop and feedback equilibria coincide when the impulse instants are exogenously given, and that they differ when these instants are endogenously determined.
For future research, it would be interesting to determine the feedback solutions for more general classes of differential games with impulse controls. A natural first candidate is the class of linear-quadratic differential games, which is often used in applications. Clearly, there would be computational challenges since the stopping set condition would involve the state variables that evolve forward in time, while the Ricatti system of players 1 and 2 evolve backwards in time. Another extension of this work could be to consider the case where both players use continuous as well as impulse controls.
Given the linear-state structure of the problem, we assume that the value function is linear and given by
and rewrite the HJB equation as Bu(t) ) .
Between the impulse instants, the equilibrium control of player 1 can be expressed in terms of the gradient of the value function of player 1 with respect to x:
Using the equilibrium control in the HJB equation, we obtain
On comparing the coefficients, we haveṁ
At the impulse instants, the value functions are related as follows:
where v i denotes the equilibrium impulse level by player 2 at the impulse instant τ i . Using V 1 (t, x) = m 1 (t)x + n 1 (t), we obtain m 1 (τ − i )x(τ − i ) + n 1 (τ − i ) = m 1 (τ + i )x(τ − i ) + m 1 (τ + i )Qv i + n 1 (τ + i ) + q 1 x(τ − i ), which results in the following update equations for the m 1 (.) and n 1 (.):
n 1 (τ − i ) = n 1 (τ + i ) + m 1 (τ + i )Qv i .
Let V 2 : [0, T ] × R → R be the value function of player 2 and assume that V 2 (t, x) = m 2 (t)x + n 2 (t),
where V 2 (T, x(T )) = s 2 x(T ). For the impulse-free region, we have the following relation:
− ∂V 2 (t, x) ∂t = w 2 x + ∂V 2 ∂x (Ax + Bu(t)), which, on substituting the equilibrium control u(t) of player 1, simplifies to w 2 x +ṁ 2 (t)x +ṅ 2 (t) + m 2 (t)(Ax − B 2 m 1 (t) R 1 ) = 0.
On comparing the above coefficients, we get for t = {τ 1 , τ 2 , . . . , τ k }, m 2 (t) = −w 2 − Am 2 (t), m 2 (T ) = s 2 ,
n 2 (t) = B 2 m 1 (t)m 2 (t) R 1 , n 2 (T ) = 0.
At the impulse instants {τ 2 , τ 2 , . . . , τ k }, the equilibrium value function of player 2 satisfies
The above equation implies that, at the impulse instant, player 2 selects the equilibrium control to maximize the value-to-go from that instant onwards. The equilibrium impulse level is obtained as follows:
Using v i in (35), we obtain
The above relation holds for all x. Therefore, we have
Using (32a), (33a), we obtain
where m 1 (τ − k+1 ) = s 1 , and
Similarly, from (34a), (37), we obtain m 2 (t) = − w 2 A + s 2 + w 1 A e A(T −t) , ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
From (31) and (36a), the equilibrium controls are obtained as follows:
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
